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The 2005 election of Evo Morales as the president of Bolivia marked 
a moment of celebration for the social movements who backed the 
rise to power of the Movimiento al Socialismo party (MAS – 
Movement for Socialism), with Morales as its leader.  Morales 
adopted discourses derived from popularly supported Buen Vivir, 
alternatives to development, social and solidarity economies, and 
other forms of localized political and economic autonomy, creating 
a politics of possibility around such proposals.  However, despite 
initial commitments and actions taken by Morales to improve well-
being without replicating historically unsustainable and destructive 
pathways to industrial development, Bolivia continues to be 
characterized by fiscal dependence and macroeconomic 
prioritization of growth-centric policies sustained by extractive 
activities.  In addition, the country is now rife with socio-
environmental conflict.  This paper will explore Morales’ neglect of 
longer-term political goals for economic independence, self-
sufficiency, and sustainability by considering competing theories of 
social movements, political parties, and the state that provide 
different lenses for understanding MAS’ abandonment of its original 
political platform for change, Twenty-First Century Socialism 
(Socialismo del Siglo XXI).  The paper reveals how the current 
scenario creates new barriers for the social movements that uphold 
proposals for sustainable futures, including deepened structural 
entrenchment in extractivism, the cooptation of alternatives to 
development proposals by government, the division of once-unified 
popular fronts, shifting electoral constituencies, and the emergence 
of new economic elites.  Lessons from the Bolivian case are 
significant for guiding wider efforts at building sustainable 
alternatives to capitalist development.  
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1. Introduction 
Latin American Social Movements and Cycles of Struggle 
  
The 2005 election of Evo Morales as the president of Bolivia 
marked a moment of celebration for the social movements who 
backed the rise of the Movimiento al Socialismo party (MAS – 
Movement for Socialism), with Morales as its leader.  The 
emergence of MAS came at a time of increasing social organization 
and resistance across Latin America against the negative 
socioeconomic and environmental effects of nearly two decades of 
structural adjustment policies, neoliberal political reforms, and 
heavy-handed foreign involvement across public sectors (Reyes 
2012).  Throughout Latin America various “moments of rupture,” 
marked by increasing social uprising and protests beginning in the 
1980s, resulted in the formation, rise to popularity, and election of 
“progressive” political parties in Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador and 
Peru.  In addition, a number of regional integration institutions 
(ALBA, UNASUR, MERCOSUR, CELAC) were created to 
promote regional collaboration and the implementation of shared 
progressive agendas (Ibid.).  While the histories, contexts, and 
dynamics of the social movement uprisings and election victories 
have their own particularities, their parallel and interrelated 
emergence reflects the existence of a broader “cycle of struggle” 
against the penetration of the continent by globally dominant socio-
economic forces, including neoliberal development, globalization, 
and imperialism (Ibid.).   
Despite the initial success of Latin American social 
movements to place populist, progressive, and anti-systemic 
candidates at the helm of states, and the subsequent improvements 
in economic and traditional development indicators in most of these 
countries, the more radical promises by many of these candidates 
have gone unmet.  The increasing (albeit uneven) opening of these 
countries to transnational corporations and private capital, the 
expansion of extractive industries and mega-infrastructure, and 
continued entrenchment of illicit drug, arms, and mining activities 
reveal grave contradictions between political discourse and practice 
(Hollender 2015, Villegas 2013 and 2014).  These activities have 
resulted in serious environmental, social, and economic 
consequences, as well as new impediments to achieving the 
sustainable pathways originally envisioned by the groups who 
supported these governments’ rise to power.  In turn, these countries 
have seen a shift in the composition of political constituencies, 
including the rise of new opposition movements, which are 
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frequently met with repressive silencing tactics, and the backing of 
progressive governments by unlikely supporters that blur traditional 
left – right divisions.  This paper will examine the phenomena of the 
abandoned political agendas of progressive Latin American 
countries by focusing on the experience of Bolivia under Evo 
Morales and the MAS party.  It will examine a number of competing 
theories of social movements, political parties, and the state that 
provide different lenses for understanding MAS’ abandonment of 
its original radical political platform for change, known as Twenty-
First Century Socialism (Socialismo del Siglo XXI). 
 
The Rise to Power of Evo Morales and MAS 
 
“...the election of Evo Morales did not bring about a revolution. 
It was a revolution that brought about the government of Evo 
Morales.” 
(Forrest and Thomson 2007) 
 
Morales’s political legacy is rooted in the Coca Growers 
Federations of Cochabamba (Confederación Cocalero del Trópico 
de Cochabamba), where he grew in prominence as a leader, thanks 
to his charisma, indigenous descent, and revolutionary discourse.  
Out of this base, Morales attracted the backing of broad swaths of 
social movements, progressive intellectuals, academics, Leftists, 
and policy analysts within Bolivia, Latin America, and globally.  
Together with his supporters he constructed a political platform that 
promised improvements in material and non-material well-being 
without replicating the unsustainable and destructive pathways to 
industrialization taken by the North. MAS raised (and continues to 
raise) expectations that Bolivia could achieve universal and 
culturally-appropriate standards of well-being (according to the 
values and principles of Buen Vivir1) through inclusive and 
endogenous processes. The rhetoric vowed to simultaneously 
liberate the country from oppressive forces of capitalism and 
imperialism, while embarking on the pluriversal2 construction of 
sustainable alternatives. 
																																								 																				
1 The literal translation of Buen Vivir is “Good life.” It was originally made popular by Kichwa, 
Quechua, and Aymara populations in the Andes, but similar concepts can be found in diverse 
indigenous cosmovisions around the world, for example Ubuntu in south eastern Africa.  Buen Vivir 
incorporates a plurality of concepts, allowing for an intersection of indigenous and occidental 
knowledge, focusing on human well-being, the “fullness of life,” the need to coexist with Nature, 
recognize its intrinsic value, and respect its physical limitations. Buen Vivir also focuses on the need 
to change the market’s role, position, and mechanisms, and the way in which humans relate to each 
other economically. (Hollender 2015)	
2 Pluriversality is a radical democratic principle that encourages the coexistence of multiple ways of 
being.  Under Morales and the new Bolivian Constitution, Bolivia was re-named the Plurinational 
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The success of Morales’s first five-year term in office was 
marked by the passing of a new constitution that established the 
preliminary framework for the construction of a non-capitalist, 
plurinational state.  The constitution included provisions to protect 
the Rights of the Mother Earth and for prioritizing Buen Vivir over 
economic indicators.  Despite controversy surrounding its final 
approval, the legislation gained Morales international acclaim and a 
second resounding electoral victory in 2010.  Another widely 
celebrated achievement of Morales’s first term was the 
“nationalization”3 of the oil and gas sector, a process which was 
followed by nationalizing portions of the telecommunications and 
electricity sectors in his second term.  During this initial period, the 
MAS administration enjoyed the unified support of the country’s six 
umbrella indigenous and peasant social movements, grouped 
together in the Unity Pact (Pacto de Unidad).  Alongside the 
government, the Unity Pact bolstered their resistance against 
external forces of domination by demonstrating how the imposition 
of neoliberalism, capitalism, and imperialism resulted in negative 
consequences for Bolivia’s people, environment, and economy.  
Simultaneously they engaged in participatory processes for 
rebuilding the country’s institutional and legislative framework to 
enable the construction of sustainable alternatives, essential pieces 
for Bolivia’s “Process of Change” (Proceso de Cambio).   
However, over the course of Morales’s second mandate 
(2010-2015), the coherence of MAS’ anti-capitalist and anti-
imperialist discourse began to unravel, as did the tightly woven 
social fabric of the Unity Pact.  In addition to the Unity Pact 
disbanding into pro and anti-government factions, a number of the 
individual social movement members of the Pact have also split, a 
process which has weakened the ability of these groups to influence 
political outcomes, as will be examined later in the paper.  A 
comprehensive description of the contradictory events, processes, 
and policy outcomes that began over the course of Morales’s second 
term and continue into the present is beyond the scope of this paper.  
However, during this period (from around 2006-present), it became 
evident that MAS had abandoned both its radical political platform 
																																								 																				
State of Bolivia (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia), acknowledging the countries’ prioritization of the 
harmonious and mutually respectful co-existence of multiple indigenous and non-indigenous 
identities.	
3 Nationalization appears in quotes because of doubts that have been raised by analysts as to the 
validity of this term.   Villegas (2013) reveals how the nationalization of oil, gas, and mining sectors 
across progressive Latin American countries was, in reality, a restructuring of contracts between host 
countries and private corporations that maintains preferential access for transnational corporations 
and reduces the possibilities for Bolivia to gain from the industrialization process.	
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and the movements that enabled its rise to power.  This is revealed 
by three parallel and interwoven trends that will be described briefly 
in the following section: (1) The unbridled development of 
legislation and policies favorable to private, capitalist, and 
transnational interests, often through non-transparent and non-
inclusive processes; (2) The rise of protest and opposition groups 
from within Morales’s original bases of support, which has been met 
by the Bolivian government with repression (sometimes violent) and 
manipulative tactics to fragment, coopt, and punish social 
movements; (3) A shift in the composition of MAS’s political 
constituents, including newly emerging entrepreneurial groups and 




Discourse vs Practice: Three Trends Reveal MAS’s 
Abandonment of Political Promises 
 
Trend 1: Twenty-First Century Capitalism in Bolivia – Policy 
Examples 
 
The most blatant evidence of the abandonment by MAS of 
its promises to reduce Bolivia’s dependence on foreign capital and 
reverse over 500 years of unsustainable of extractive development 
has been the expansion of predatory extractivism.4  Although the 
Morales government originally opposed extractivism for being 
environmentally and socially destructive, unjust, economically 
unstable, and associated with the expansion of capitalist processes 
of accumulation, MAS’ policy record reveals the contrary: Morales 
has opened national parks to fossil fuel exploration, exploitation, 
and pipelines, reversed the process of land reform to favor private 
interests and large landholders, inaugurated new mining, 
hydroelectric projects, and highways without and/or in spite of the 
lack of legally-required prior informed consent by local 
communities (Hollender 2015, Bjork-James 2013, Villegas 2013 
and 2014, Webber 2012a and 2012b).  The negative impacts of these 
projects are documented by local communities, with the support of 
organized civil society groups, in efforts to build opposition 
campaigns to the government’s unsustainable activity.5  Less 
																																								 																				
4 Predatory extractivism refers to the expansion of extractive activities beyond hydrocarbons and 
minerals to agriculture, forestry, and fishing, and also to foreign control of arable land and water 
resources.  It involves the use of increasingly risky technologies (such as fracking and deep-sea 
drilling), and reduced regard for ecosystem integrity and social rights (as extractive activities have 
expanded into protected areas and indigenous territories).	
5 See, for example: http://tipnisresiste.blogspot.com/, http://www.somossur.net/, 
http://www.territoriosenresistencia.org/, http://www.ftierra.org/, http://www.cedib.org/, 	
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documented, but equally obvious to the public eye in Bolivia is the 
proliferation of illicit drug cultivation, trafficking, and related 
money-laundering operations which has resulted in an 
unprecedented boom in Bolivia’s real estate, construction, and auto 
import sectors.  The explosion of illegal mining activities in 
Bolivia’s remote and fragile natural areas are more widely 
documented (See CEDIB 2014).   
An explosion in new legislation, natural resource 
concessions, contracts with transnational corporations, and growth 
in export volumes of primary materials6 reflect the intensification of 
extractive fossil fuel, mining, and agroindustry activities.  At the 
beginning of Morales’s second term many of these legislative 
processes were hidden behind closed doors, unbeknownst to the 
participants of lengthy and inclusive drafting processes, often with 
Unity Pact involvement.  These non-transparent and secretive 
legislative process provoked shock, discontent, and outcry as 
unrecognizable legislation was passed, sideswiping legitimate 
participatory processes.  Currently, however, MAS makes fewer 
attempts to hide its plans.  In 2014 Bolivia’s Chief of Cabinet of the 
Ministry of Economics and Public Finance confirmed MAS’ plans 
to “take advantage of the possibility of growth through the 
exploitation of natural resources, with the state capturing the surplus 
and redistributing it to social programs and to other economic 
sectors that generate unemployment” (Webber 2014, Williams and 
Olivera 2015).  Likewise, the country’s vice president, Alvaro 
Garcia Linera, announced the expansion of Bolivia’s “agricultural 
frontier” at a rate of one million hectares per year until 2025 
(Bustillos 2015).  It is expected that the country will officially 
legalize7 genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the coming 
year, despite widespread public opposition (Ibid., Williams and 
Olivera 2015).  
While Bolivia’s export-oriented extractive development 
model has resulted in impressive economic growth, as reflected by 
																																								 																				
6 Mining growth increased from 170,000-450,000 metric tons from 2006-2012 and the value of 
mineral exports doubled to $1.6 billion from 2008-2013. Natural gas exports also doubled to 64.54 
million cubic meters/day from 2005-2014.  (ZIbichi 2014)	
7 GMOs are currently prohibited by the constitution, but make up 99% of Bolivia’s 1 million acres 
of soy, and significant percentages of the country’s sugar cane and wheat crops.  In 2013 MAS 
legislators took a first step toward legalizing GMOs through the use of ambiguous and contradictory 
language in the 2013 Law of Agrarian Reform (Ley de la Reforma Agraria), which was passed in 
secret and without consideration of years of participatory work on the law’s proposal by the Unity 
Pact and Bolivian campesino movements.  	
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Bolivia’s continuously increasing GDP8 (until early 2014), social 
spending, and international reserves9, Bolivia’s 2015 growth and 
budget projections reflect government plans to cut back in the face 
of plummeting mineral, gas, and oil prices.10  Villegas questions the 
soundness of many economic decisions taken by the MAS 
government in order to attract private capital and foreign investment 
to Bolivia’s extractive sector.  For example, Bolivia’s Mining Law, 
rewritten in 2014, includes a provision that allows transnational 
mining corporations to cease tax payments if mineral prices drop 
below certain thresholds.  Due to the current (predicted) drop in 
global commodity prices, Bolivia is not receiving tax payments for 
minerals extracted by international companies aside from those 
removing zinc ores (Villegas 2013 and 2014).  Another questionable 
response by Bolivia to the commodity crash has been to make up for 
lost revenue by increasing rates of mining and gas exploitation in 
conjunction with increasing the taxation of citizens, a perverse bail-
out by Bolivian taxpayers (Villegas 2014).  Not only do these 
policies contradict MAS’ policy discourse, they result in a further 
embedding of Bolivia in capitalist relationships of economic 
volatility and dependency on foreign capital, environmental 
destruction, and inequality, making it even more difficult for Bolivia 
to follow the alternative pathways to well-being that many social 
movement groups still uphold (Hollender 2015).   
 
Trend 2: Internal Outcry and Repression of Dissent 
 
MAS’ contradictory policies have sparked costly internal 
economic and political problems.  Many waves of anti-Morales 
protests, such as the TIPNIS highway controversy, have attracted 
global attention due to their magnitude.11  Less visible are the near 
																																								 																				
8 Since 2005 the economy has grown at an average of 5% annually, due to high international prices 
for primary materials and growth in export volumes. (Zibichi 2014, Villegas 2015)	
9 International reserves exploded from $1.7 - $14.43 billion from 2005-2013, representing 47% of 
GDP. (Zibichi 2014).	
10 The sustainability of basing social spending and redistribution programs on finite resources has 
been widely critiqued, as has the effectiveness of the programs (Hollender 2015).	
11 Perhaps the most visible of these is the conflict surrounding the highway project in the Isiboro-
Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS) in Bolivia. In 2008 the Bolivian government 
signed an agreement with Brazil to finance and build a 177km highway through the legal territory of 
three indigenous groups (64 communities). TIPNIS is also a national park with globally significant 
biodiversity. The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) agreed to finance 80% of the highway 
construction leaving the remaining 20% to the Bolivian government. In a questionable bidding 
process, the Brazilian construction company Constructora OAS Ltda., was hired to carry out the 
project. The deal also included preferential access for Brazil to the phosphates that were to be 
extracted along with lithium from the Salar de Uyuni, another controversial project (Hollender & 
Shultz 2010). The TIPNIS highway project was approved without consulting local communities, and 
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daily instances of local communities defending their social and 
environmental rights from extractive projects and policies. The 
multiple forms of protest, including marches, roadblocks, occupying 
public spaces, hunger strikes, etc., reflect the discontent with MAS’ 
failure to carry out the changes that their initial supporters expected 
(Bjork-James 2013).    
 
Whereas MAS was once known as a “government of social 
movements,” Morales’ second and third terms have been marked by 
oppressive and anti-democratic backlash tactics against the very 
movements that carried the party into power.  Such tactics include: 
violent repression of indigenous protest against environmentally and 
socially destructive projects (such as the TIPNIS march); 
stigmatization of environmentalists, critics, and opposition 
members as “counterrevolutionary” or secretly allied with 
imperialist powers12; deliberate strategies to divide and weaken 
opposition movements; and nepotism exercised through political 
and material rewards for pro-government counter- mobilizations 
that “defend the process of change” in the face of protesters 
(Hollender 2015, Zibichi 2014).  As a result, the Unity Pact has been 
completely dissolved and once-unified movements split into pro- 
and anti-government factions.  The split initiated during the 65 day 
march to protest the TIPNIS highway project as a result of a series 
of (sometimes violent) confrontations that erupted between Unity 
Pact movements and members of CONAMAQ and CIDOB 
movements.  The confrontations revealed the diverging opinions of 
movement members over whether to continue supporting MAS, 
despite the party’s growing acceptance of activities including mega-
projects and predatory extractivism.  The more critical factions of 
both CONAMAQ and CIDOB, which eventually split off to form 
new, “organic” movements, are concerned that these activities 
necessitate forming relationships of dependency with transnational 
corporations and multi-lateral development banks, violating legal 
environmental and social safeguards, and increasing the extent to 
																																								 																				
aroused fierce opposition, including a 65 day, 526 km protest march from TIPNIS to La Paz. The 
march met violent government repression resulting in 72-280 protesters injured. The highway project 
was temporarily suspended, but the conflict has yet to be resolved. (See Bjork-James 2013, Villegas 
2013, and www.territoriosenresistencia.org)	
12 The labeling by Evo Morales of Northern environmentalism as a new “predatory colonialism” at 
the UN “Rio+20” Conference and in other international forums has resulted in mixed messages to 
the international environmental community. See articles in Bloomberg 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-21/bolivia-s-morales-calls-environmentalism-
predatory-colonialism.html) and at ejolt (http://www.ejolt.org/2013/10/full-belly-
environmentalism-of-lead/)	
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which Bolivia’s economy is wedded to volatile global markets and 
neoliberal policy institutions.   
While continued loyalty to MAS has afforded economic and 
political benefits to pro-government factions (see below), pact 
members who have been vocal in exposing MAS’ betrayal accuse 
the government of engaging in physical violence, looting of 
headquarters, and corruption tactics in order to “manipulate, divide, 
and influence of the functional and representative bodies of the 
indigenous peoples of Bolivia” (Achtenbeg 2014, Zibichi 2014).  
Aside from the physical, psychological, and economic impacts of 
MAS’ tactics in the short-run, Bolivian social movements can no 
longer focus their efforts on building sustainable and culturally 
appropriate alternatives to global systems of domination, but instead 
must confront internal repression by their own government 
(Gutierrez 2012, Reyes 2012).  Ironically, the success of Bolivian 
social movements to bring MAS to power has led to a deterioration 
of the conditions and possibilities for legitimate political 
participation upon which the success of the movements has been 
measured (Ibid.). 
In addition to government repression of social movements, 
four highly-regarded Bolivian non-profit organizations13 that 
conduct research and analysis on the economic, social, and 
environmental implications of extractive activities, natural resource 
concessions, land reform, agro-industry expansion, international 
investment relationships, etc. and have been accused by the 
government of “lying and political meddling” for criticizing the 
expanding extractive development model (Achtenberg 2015a).14  
The data collection, analysis, and documentation done by these 
NGOs is crucial for understanding the relationship of local 
environmental, social, and economic conditions to national and 
global policies and trends, with findings that have implications far 
beyond Bolivia’s borders.  There is concern that MAS’s backlash on 
critical voices in civil society, including those of NGOs and social 
movements, threatens intellectual and academic knowledge-
production, political organizing, and ultimately, democratic 
processes. 
 




13 The four NGOs include the Center for the Study of Labor and Agrarian Development (CEDLA), the 
Bolivian Center for Documentation and Information (CEDIB), and the Tierra and Milenio Foundations.	
14 In addition to cracking down on Bolivian NGOs who are critical of MAS policies, the government expelled 
Danish NGO Ibis in 2013 for its involvement in supporting indigenous communities around their legal right 
to Free and Prior Informed Consent in their territories, and has mandated that all foreign and domestic 
NGOs undergo a registration process, including approval of their social contribution (Achtenberg 2015a).		
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Given the shifting loyalties of the MAS government away 
from its pro-indigenous political agenda to uphold local 
environmental and social priorities, it isn’t surprising that the 
political constituencies in Bolivia have shifted.  In overall terms 
MAS continues to be the favored party nationally, as evidenced by 
its 61% presidential victory in October 2014 and its retaining of the 
majority of legislative seats (majority in six out of nine 
departments), municipal mayor positions (66% popular vote across 
municipalities nationally), and departmental governorships (secure 
wins in 4 departments, leading in 2 contested elections) in sub-
national elections in March 2015.  However, upon closer look it is 
possible to see significant shifts in party loyalty away from previous 
supporters and towards non-traditional constituencies.  For example, 
the breakdown of votes from the 2014 presidential election reveals 
significant losses in support from traditional stronghold Aymara and 
Quechua indigenous populations in La Paz, El Alto, and 
Cochabamba (Fidler 2015).  In sub-national elections in 2015 MAS 
also lost key positions including governor of La Paz, mayor of El 
Alto, and mayor of Cochabamba (Ibid.).  However, for the first time 
MAS won a majority of votes in the presidential election in Santa 
Cruz, which is the traditional seat of power of the agroindustry lobby 
and large land holding elite.  This victory is thought to reflect the 
strategic alliance with the country’s traditionally right-winged 
agricultural oligarchy, which is the primary beneficiary of the large-
scale expansion of agro-industrial sectors, such as soy, timber, cattle 
ranging into the country’s forested lowlands (Zibichi 2014).  These 
election results reflect the abandonment of MAS by lowland 
indigenous communities as they witness the government hand over 
land concessions, once promised to grant permanent rights to 
ancestral territories, over to agribusiness and timber interests 
(Achtenber 2015b).  
Outside of election results, the (coercive) reorganization of 
social movements and the rise of a new indigenous elite also reveal 
new unlikely government allies and foes.  The tumultuous breakup 
of the Unity Pact has created rival offshoots of previously united 
social movements, divided according to pro vs antigovernment 
stance.  In addition, the significant economic growth in the country 
has contributed to a rise of a new economic elite in Bolivia, who do 
not form part of the traditionally right-leaning elite.  This group, 
often referred to as the “new indigenous bourgeoisie,” is made up of 
agricultural producers and traders in Bolivia’s low-lying areas and 
small mining cooperatives in the highlands15 (Williams and Olivera 
																																								 																				
15	While highland mining cooperatives have been granted protection to mining concessions, 
practices, and market access in the face of state and private-sector mining companies, these 
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2015).  The emerging bourgeoisie reflects a new entrepreneurial 
spirit embodying the values of homo economicus16 and defying the 
revolutionary stereotype that has come to characterize members of 
Bolivia’s popular classes.  The Financial Times has drawn attention 
to the economic savvy of this group, who engage in “responsible” 
practices of savings, investment, fiscal austerity, and responsiveness 
to the market (Financial Times 2014).   Also noteworthy is the 
crucial role that these new market-driven sectors play in facilitating 
alliances between the government and key sectors of international 
capital, thereby “opening the door to transnational corporations…” 
(Williams and Olivera 2015).  MAS has capitalized on the “ethnic” 
support it receives from the new bourgousie, whose presence gives 
the appearance of continued indigenous backing on the surface, 
despite social movement upheaval.17  Sociologist Sarela Paz 
confirms that MAS’ composition has changed: “It’s a reflection of 
the breakdown of the popular coalition and the rise of a new power 
structure whose epicenter is partnership and coordination between 
eastern agribusiness sectors, oil sectors, and emerging sectors using 
ethnic rooting as a device for political mobilization” (ZIbichi 2014). 
 
 
2. Theoretical Analysis 
Despite the blatant contradictions that underlie Morales’ 
radical political rhetoric, the MAS government continues to pay lip 
service to the original campaign platform.  The remainder of this 
paper will explore different explanations for the abandonment by 
MAS of its political promises.  It will draw from theories of social 
movements, political parties, and the state, but ultimately argue that 
																																								 																				
cooperatives are notorious for engaging in exploitative labor practices, unregulated mineral refining 
processes, illegal acquisition of concessions from indigenous territories, tax fraud, and political 
corruption that have devastating effects on local communities and ecosystems and distort the 
economic context of the mining sector. (Villegas and Gandarillas 2014)	
16 A term referring to John Steward Mills (1874) conceptualization of the rational economic man, 
based on the argument that human behavior is grounded in pursuing self-interest and personal 
profit, denying the possibility of collective values, altruism, or reciprocity that are traditionally 
associated with Andean culture. 
17 The government continually uses a series of rhetorical and political tools to mask the implications 
of their betrayal of political promises. For example, the incorporation of indigenous concepts, styles 
of dress, rituals, and language into the governments’ promotion and celebration of new extractive 
projects is a manipulative and contradictory tool of cooptation (Bjork-James 2013: 257). These 
tactics serve to minimize the importance of environmental criteria in decision-making and distract 
from the fact that now-declining social spending and budget booms are based on finite resources.  	
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the interaction of these realms together, and with wider economic 
and political contexts, is required for understanding Bolivia’s case.   
 
Social movement theory  
 
“Any analysis of movement outcomes must examine the structure 
and strategies of the relevant exogenous political actors and 
institutions.” 
(Andrews 2001, p73) 
 
One possible frame for understanding the abandonment of 
political promises by Morales is to look at whether and how social 
movements contributed to this abandonment.  Although social 
movements celebrated Morales’ victory, they were unable to further 
effectuate their longer-term political goals for economic 
independence, self-sufficiency, sustainability, etc.  This section will 
examine social movement theories that postulate how the structures, 
objectives, and strategies of social movements influence their ability 
to influence policy making and to resist forces of repression.   
Social movements are considered important actors in agenda 
setting, and for their ability to influence the discourse, procedures, 
and behavior of states (Keck and Sikking 1999).  As such, they 
contribute to the creation of “policy windows,” or the unique 
opportunities for policy proposals to be adopted by decision-makers, 
resulting in changes in the policy status quo (Baumgartner and Jones 
2009, Keeler 1993).  The introduction illustrated the extraordinary 
political circumstances in Latin America in the late 90’s and early 
2000’s, which were marked by the electoral victories of progressive 
leaders in more than half the countries in the region.  While it is 
impossible to pin down the exact factors that allowed for this 
unusual degree of policy change, it is certain that the region’s social 
movements were instrumental.   One hypothesis is that the 
cumulative efforts of national and regional social movements 
created a “moment of rupture” (or policy window) that allowed a 
new type of leadership and political agenda to take the policy stage 
(changing the policy status quo) (Reyes 2012).  In Bolivia, breaking 
the status quo involved the election of the world’s first indigenous 
president, followed shortly with the passing into legislation of the 
New Constitution, both exceptional examples of policy change.   
Another possible explanation of this unique historical 
moment in Latin American history is Kingdon’s (2003) Multiple 
Streams Theory, which attributes policy change to the coming 
together of problem, policy, and politics.  Applied to Bolivia, the 
rise of distinct social movements who each proposed alternatives to 
neoliberalism (problem) occurred at a time when national and 
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regional political environments were favorable to the replacement 
of neoliberal regimes (politics) with progressive presidents (policy).  
With this socio-political confluence in place, unified social 
movements enabled the leadership that would later be responsible 
for policy formulation and implementation.   
In addition to contributing to the conditions for policy 
change, social movements employ a number of organizational and 
tactical strategies that allow them to have an impact on policy.  In 
Latin America the strategies of social movements cannot be 
understood in isolation, but must be seen as the result of 
accumulated learning from previous and parallel social and political 
struggles.  In other words, the contiguous “cycles of revolt” that 
have marked the continent since colonial times cannot be taken 
separately from the current movement’s achievements (Reyes 
2012). For example, it can be argued that characteristics of the 
communal and traditional structures of Bolivia’s indigenous 
communities, in continuous evolution since precolonial times, have 
been inherited by modern social movements (MIgnolo 2010).  In 
addition, the lessons afforded by Bolivia’s transition to democracy 
in the 1980’s has been important for preparing new social movement 
leaders (including Morales himself), as well as for creating a 
political dynamic responsive to movement-led change (Centellas 
2015).  Finally, Morrow and Torres (2007) argue that the strength 
of transnational civil society in Latin America, which encompasses 
a wider group of political actors and is itself a product of historical 
trajectories of struggle and change, provided support and 
contributed to the initial success of Bolivian movements.   
 
Deliberately generating cumulative efforts and impacts is 
also an important strategy of social movements, as shown by 
Andrews (2001) in his examination of the Mississippi civil rights 
movement.  Andrews defines successful social movements, not in 
terms of isolated legislative changes or electoral victories, but via 
their ability to present a sustained challenge to existing power 
relations.  This discrepancy is important for evaluating the extent to 
which Bolivian social movements were “successful” beyond initial 
presidential and legislative victories.  Andrews demonstrates how 
the Mississippi civil rights movement was able to impact policy 
implementation continuously and across levels by focusing on a 
combination of “infrastructure” (including organizational structure, 
resources, and leadership) and mechanisms of influence (including 
disruption, persuasion, and bargaining).  His resulting “movement 
infrastructure model” can be applied to the six movements of the 
Unity Pact to evaluate their ability to achieve long-term viability and 
impact.   
According to Andrews’ model, the strong initial 
infrastructure of the Unity Pact movements, each with their own 
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organizational structures, autonomous decision-making processes, 
and independent leadership, should have served to reduce threats to 
disarm or weaken them.  However, this infrastructure changed after 
Morales’ election when many social movement leaders were given 
roles within the MAS party.  Also at this time, government resources 
were channeled to support the movements of the Unity Pact in the 
form of funding, office space, etc.   
The newly blurred boundaries that resulted from MAS 
taking power may have contributed to the dissolution of the Unity 
Pact over time.  Whereas the leadership of Evo Morales was 
originally strategic for the Unity Pact, the resulting recruitment of 
Pact leaders by MAS split their loyalty between movement and 
government, setting the stage for later instances of cooptation and 
corruption.  Pact members who maintained independent funding 
streams from international actors or members of transnational civil 
society became targets of MAS’ attack for having alleged ties to 
imperialist interests (Zibichi 2014).  According to Andrew’s theory, 
the relationships of dependency and related conflicts of interests of 
social movement leaders explains the inability of the Unity Pact to 
withstand divisive, cooptive, and corrupt tactics by the Bolivian 
government.  The Pact’s eventual disbanding prevented the 
movements from following up on implementation and compliance 
of the policy agenda and legislation that they’d fought so hard to 
achieve.   
 
Theories of Political Parties 
 
“MAS is…the product of the accumulation of social forces 
around which today commands scant consensus and remains 




Although the means through which Bolivian social 
movements gained insertion into national policy-making was 
through the formation of a successful political party, MAS, the 
decline in coherence and impact of the Unity Pact is insufficient for 
explaining the behavior of Morales and MAS once elected to the 
presidency.  Since it was ultimately the MAS party that failed to 
implement its promised agenda for change, it is necessary to 
investigate theories that examine the role of political parties and the 
state in policy change. 
What is important here is to examine why MAS abandoned 
its political agenda once the party had control of the government.  
Burstein and Linton (2002) suggest that political parties with strong 
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ideological leanings (such as MAS) enter in a dilemma once they 
are elected to power.  On one hand, parties are concerned with 
consolidating their power, either through reelection, expansion into 
legislative bodies, or through legislative backing.  Depending on the 
wider political environment, this might require abandoning extreme 
political positions in order to garner votes across diverse publics.  
On the other hand, parties remain concerned with transforming 
ideological agendas into policies (Ibid.).  It can be argued that during 
Morales’ first term, the MAS party was able to address both 
electoral and ideological concerns in a complementary fashion.  The 
landslide presidential victory in 2005 (53.72% of votes compared to 
28.62% for the closest competitor) and overwhelming support and 
participation from Bolivia’s indigenous and social movements gave 
Morales the endorsement he needed to move forward with bold 
legislative changes that simultaneously consolidated MAS’ power 
and laid the foundation for progressive policy implementation, such 
as the strong social and environmental priorities that are reflected in 
the New Constitution.  As a result, the new constitution18 and 
nationalization measures were passed in Morales’ first term despite 
staunch opposition from the eastern lowland “Media Luna” region. 
19  Morales was never dependent on this region for electoral victory, 
yet he has favored policies that are attractive to Media Luna voters, 
for example measures to expand agroindustry.  This demonstrates 
that it is insufficient to analyze MAS’ behavior according to 
electoral concerns alone.  The party’s internal dynamics must also 
be evaluated.   
A review by Centellas (2015) examines how, during its 
period of formation, MAS employed strategies to attract allies 
across political sectors, including social movements and traditional 
Bolivian parties, in order to improve its chances of winning the 2005 
elections.  However, after rising to power MAS began to exclude 
longtime supporters as well as latecomers who weren’t formal party 
members, resulting in the alienation of some social movements and 
the disbanding of the Unity Pact (Ibid.).  This strategy of party 
consolidation suggests that MAS had considerable agency in 
attracting and selecting from a wide pool of supporters, in contrast 
with narratives that attribute both MAS’ existence and composition 
to Unity Pact social movements.  These opposite accounts of the 
relationship between MAS and social movements up to and during 
																																								 																				
18 The New Constitution effectively re-set Morales’ presidential term count to zero, allowing for him 
to run for a third term in October 2014, a controversial move that followed the example set by 
Presidents Chavez and Correa after they instituted new constitutions in Venezuela and Ecuador.	
19 The ruling parties of Bolivia’s eastern lowland “Media Luna” (Half Moon) region are traditionally 
associated with transnational capital and the landholding political elite.  Their primary political 
concerns include maintaining rights to land, private property (including businesses), and natural 
resource royalties, essential to their economic and political power.	
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Morales’ first term have important implications for understanding 
the shifting constituencies that occurred after his reelection in 2010.  
For example, if MAS was never a party of social movements, but 
merely cooperated with and adopted social movement discourse as 
an electoral strategy, its eventual betrayal of radical movements can 
be more easily understood.   
It is impossible to determine whether Morales ever fully 
intended to pursue a radical political agenda or if wealth distribution 
and constitutional reform were also strategies to obtain electoral 
victory.  However, even in his third term Morales continues to 
espouse the anti-systemic and anti-imperialist “Socialism of the 
Twenty-first Century” discourse that marked his rise to power.  
Regardless of MAS’ true priorities, the party’s policy legacy can be 
described as contradictory, patchy, or inconsistent at best.  On one 
hand, Morales increasingly conforms to an economic growth agenda 
based on extractive activities and catering to the demands of 
transnational corporations/interests (?).  On the other hand his high 
spending on social programs and public services (albeit financed by 
extractive revenues) reflect an adherence to populist redistribution.  
Beyond social movement and party politics, these contradictions 
demand a continued examination of wider contextual factors that 
constrain Bolivia’s autonomy in policy making. 
 
Theories of the State in Context 
 
“…the state is not…helpless against the onslaught of global 
economic forces but rather an area of contestation in which 
political (and ideological) rivals challenge each other within the 
constraints and opportunities afforded by ever-changing political 
and economic landscapes.” 
(Centellas 2015, p231) 
 
MAS’ shifting agenda did not happen in a vacuum and 
cannot be understood by electoral politics and organizational 
dynamics alone.  In order to analyze MAS’ abandonment of political 
promises, these actions must be examined within a context of global 
systems that dictate a series of demands and constraints on state 
actors.  A number of theories will be useful for understanding the 
role that dominant global paradigms have in influencing the 
behavior of the Bolivian government under MAS.  Together these 
theories form the backbone of a longstanding debate about whether 
using the state as a vehicle for change is a viable strategy for radical 
actors. 
Critical theory argues that the actions of states must be 
understood as a function of diverse and interdependent relationships 
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and contexts beyond state borders, and not limited to internal 
political and institutional arrangements and activities (Morrow and 
Torres 2007).  In other words, no state can act in isolation from its 
wider context.  Given that the state has real needs for resources and 
legitimacy in order to act, not all of which are bestowed internally, 
it must act in accordance with certain systems in order to obtain 
these capacities (Ibid.).  Depending on each state’s capacity and 
position, this might involve subscribing to the rules of multiple and 
overlapping systems of domination, such as neoliberalism, 
globalization, capitalism, development, and hegemonic politics.  As 
a result, it is impossible to understand the rise of new political actors 
and policy agendas at the state level without considering the 
contextual factors that shape their motivation and behavior.   
In the case of Bolivia, the government has justified its 
expansion of extractive activities and preferential treatment to 
foreign corporations as necessary for generating revenue for 
extensive social spending, a strategy that MAS claims does not 
preclude the construction of Twenty-First Century Socialism 
(Hollender 2015).  However, it has not gone unnoticed that this 
strategy coincides with the long-term interests of transnational 
capital.  Theories that examine how actions of the state are affected 
by and respond to dominant socioeconomic contexts might conclude 
that MAS’ expansion of extractivism is evidence that the Bolivian 
state has been reconstituted to serve the mandate of global economic 
and political prerogatives (Drezner 2001, Reyes 2012, Gutierrez 
2012).  In other words, to the extent that Bolivia depends on the 
resources and legitimacy it obtains by participating in international 
capitalist relationships, as rulers of the state, MAS becomes at once 
a participant in and instrument of capitalist expansion, regardless of 
its ideological position.20   This allows us to draw two conclusions 
about MAS’ mixed bag of policies: first, Morales and MAS have 
had limited room to maneuver within Bolivia’s entrapment in 
structures of dependent development, resulting in their catering to 
the interests of transnational capital (and inability to uphold the 
environmental and social safeguards that are upheld in the New 
Constitution); second, MAS retains a certain level of autonomy as 
																																								 																				
20 This echoes concerns from post-development theorists who argue that official development policies, as 
an extension of capitalist agendas, are in direct contradiction with environmental and social goals.   
Post-development theorists agree that (1) Development is grounded in a universal conceptualization of 
modernity and progress that mimics Northern models of industrialization, consumption, and 
economic growth, which (2) necessitates the use of top-down, coercive, forceful, or hegemonic 
implementation mechanisms and the elimination or cooptation of alternatives; (3) Development 
policy furthers the global embedding of capitalist systems, norms, and institutions that serve and 
protect the interests of powerful elites; (4) Development is in direct contradiction with its own 
stated environmental and social goals (Gudynas 2012, Escobar 2010, Esteva 2013, Lang et al. 2012, 
Pieterse 1996).  	
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the government of a sovereign state, which allowed it to direct the 
resources generated by increased extractive activities during a 
commodity price boom to populist redistribution and social policies. 
The mix of policies has had mixed results for Bolivia.  For 
example, different groups have benefited from the high levels of 
social spending: first, Bolivian citizens benefited from the (albeit 
uneven) distribution of benefits (Reyes 2012, Hollender 2015); 
second, redistributive policies reinforced the popularity of the MAS 
government; and third, the market stability and economic growth 
generated by the programs were celebrated by neoliberal institutions 
who promote “’the market’ as the “organizing principle and 
objective of the state,” (Reyes 2012, p11).  As a result, the spending 
policy has been labeled as “nationally redistributive neoliberalism,” 
referring to the fact that while Bolivia has the autonomy to designate 
revenue destinations, this can only occur “under the supervision of 
the market,” (as opposed to a socialist model of markets under state 
regulation) (Ibid.).  This relationship of market dependence is 
further exemplified by the measures taken by MAS to attract 
transnational capital in the extractive industries at the expense of 
environmental sustainability, indigenous rights, and 
macroeconomic stability.  Hence, despite the short-term gains 
afforded by social spending, the very possibilities afforded by 
Bolivia’s state leadership within a global market-driven system 
reveals the limited and relative nature of Morales’ authority. 
 
 Social Movements and the State  
  
“Taking power is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to 
change the world.” 
(Holloway 2005) 
 
“Currently, emancipatory struggles occur in the midst of neoliberal 
capitalist relations and under a political order embodied by 
increasingly transnationalized nation-states.” 
(Gutierrez 2012, p57) 
 
MAS has expanded extractivism and constructed a model of 
social spending that is highly subjected to volatile international 
markets, which has taken Bolivia further from conditions of well-
being, economic independence, and alternatives to development, 
especially as commodity prices have plummeted (Hollender 2015).  
Whereas Marxist theory might attribute this situation to the 
capitalist cooptation of the political party, decolonial theorists argue 
that the situation is far more complex (and irremediable through 
state processes): “the social movements have lost their position of 
political protagonism due to the symbolic authority afforded to the 
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progressive governments while the progressive governments have 
in turn increasingly lost the social base necessary to produce 
substantive change within the state” (Reyes 212, p13).  This view 
questions whether the election of progressive leaders to the head of 
states should be celebrated as a victory, given that state leaders are 
necessarily embedded in institutions and processes that legitimize 
neoliberalism and capitalist globalization, the very systems which 
the movements elected MAS to oppose.   
The result of the current scenario in Bolivia is doubly 
debilitating for the social movements of the Unity Pact: first, the 
movements have been relegated from their position of influence as 
engaged subjects in participatory political processes to objects of 
government coercion and social assistance (at least until assistance 
runs out or becomes constrained by conservative fiscal policy due 
to the commodity bust); second, as a result of fragmentation and 
dissolution, social movements have lost the ability to effectively 
pressure MAS to respond to their demands (Reyes 2012, Gutierrez 
2012).   As repression tactics are extended from social movements 
to include foreign and domestic NGOs, the only voices advocating 
for environmental protection and sustainable alternatives to 
extractive development are silenced.  These discouraging results 
require more closely examining the contradictions inherent in 
pursuing a strategy of radical anti-systemic change from within the 
structures of the state, an actor that necessarily operates within the 
logic of dominant systems.  Despite Marxists’ convictions of the 
ability to change the world by taking state power, Reyes (2012) 
argues that this creates a “never-ending chain of hegemony and 
counterhegemony” (p14) in which the demands of social 
movements will always be reactions to the existing social order, an 
irreconcilable impasse for the construction of alternatives.21   
From the perspective of Bolivian social movements, the 
initial election of Morales and achievements of MAS’ first term 
were seen as successes. For the social movement constituencies and 
new bourgeoisie that remain supportive of MAS these successes 
have continued into the second and third terms.  However, from the 
lens of radical movements, taking state power may have been one 
tactic among many in a wider strategy of transformation and not an 
end in itself, and therefore not a measure of long-term success.  
Movement participant and anthropologist Raquel Gutierrez (2012) 
																																								 																				
21 This view is similar to that held by the Zapatistas who are explicit in their rejection of the state as a 
vehicle for transformational change.  They argue that power is something that some have and others 
don’t, and therefore taking state power will always be a tool of control and domination, involving an 
impossible and inescapable cycle (Esteva 2014, Leon de Mattis 2011).  Massimo de Angeles (2014) 
differentiates between “power-to” versus “power-over” as a key distinction that must be made in 
building strategies for confronting capitalism.  	
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argues that the notion of success held by radical social movements 
isn’t anchored in concrete end goals, but rather to an ideal of social 
emancipation.  She defines this emancipatory ideal as “a growing 
and intermittent trajectory or itinerary that arises from the persistent 
state of subjection and powerlessness that we bear in order to 
collectively and directly intervene in the decisions about and 
implementation of issues that concern each and every person – what 
are usually called “public matters.” (This contrasts with political 
emancipation, or the “persistence of the capacity to subvert the 
dominant order,” by which Andrews (2002) measures success (Ibid. 
p58).)   Similarly, Reyes (2012) argues that the idea of success for 
the radical movements only results from “the struggle for the 
creation of nondominination (a reordering made possible by the 
creation of as-yet-unknown places)” (p17).  Both of these visions 
emphasize the importance of the gradual and evolving construction 
of alternatives to the dominant order, above and beyond the 
antagonistic resistance to repressive systems.  This vision resonates 
with a growing group of global actors engaged in radical democratic 
processes of open-ended, pluriversal, and prefigurative politics in 
order to build alternatives to capitalism, a point that will be taken up 
in the conclusion (Hollender 2015b). 
What is important to emphasize here, is that while taking the 
state has led to important achievements in Bolivian political and 
legislative history, it has revealed itself to be a questionable strategy 
for transformational change.  If new social movement uprisings 
replicate the state-taking strategy they will face two risks: (1) 
repeating the cycle of radical political parties being dissolved by the 
tasks, obligations, and rational of the state, or (2) once again 
reducing radical subjects to a mere interest group within civil society 
with competing demands before the state (Reyes 2012).  Despite the 
historical tendency of these processes to repeat by groups who 
challenge capitalism, theorists and movements alike continue to 
argue the possibility of inverting state structures so as to foster the 
construction of environmentally, economically, and socially 
sustainable alternatives by social movements (Ibid.) 
This paper does not argue in favor of either side in the 
longstanding state vs. non-state debate, but agrees with a growing 
view that recognizes the value of both approaches to change.  
“Either can happen anywhere…the two aspects can be 
complementary or contradictory.” (Midnight Notes Collective and 
Friends 2009, p13).  This approach acknowledges both the 
inevitability and the value of the persistence of both state and non-
state approaches to systemic transformation.  Just as state-focused 
efforts are seen to be at risk for cooptation, they are also viewed as 
offering real possibilities for creating alternatives.  Similarly, while 
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the anti-state focus may be admired for ideological force, such 
initiatives don’t guarantee the widespread participation necessary 
for society-wide transformation.  In addition, any attempt to be 
totalizing in strategy, regardless of whether it favors state or non-
state approaches, threatens to be a limitation to all efforts to 
transform politics22 in order to allow for the construction of 
alternatives, at least until the future becomes clearer.   
 
3. Conclusion - Implications for Alternative Futures  
The outcomes of MAS’s rise to power have been 
disappointing for Bolivians and onlookers who hoped that Bolivia 
(and other Latin American countries undergoing similar processes) 
would become the site of lasting anti-capitalist experimentation for 
large-scale and long-term system change.  The initial commitments 
by President Morales to improve well-being without replicating 
historically unsustainable and destructive pathways to industrial 
development created a politics of possibility around these proposals, 
as did notable redistributive economic policy measures, nationalized 
natural resources, constitutionalization of principles of 
sustainability (e.g. rights of Mother Earth, plurinationality, non-
economic conceptions of quality of life such as Buen Vivir, etc.), 
spearheaded regional integration through ALBA, UNASUR, 
CELAC, etc., and upheld environmental justice agendas in 
international arenas (e.g. equal but differentiated responsibilities, 
prior informed consent, right to development, climate debt, etc.). 
However, notwithstanding these achievements, Bolivia continues to 
be characterized by fiscal dependence and macroeconomic 
prioritization of growth-centric policies sustained by natural 
resource extraction.  The immediate economic, social, and 
environmental consequences have led to extensive socio-
environmental debates.   
While the current Bolivian policy environment continues 
taking the country further away from alternative possibilities, the 
cumulative nature of social movement learning and cycles of 
resistance do not preclude the possibility of future transformation.  
Reyes (2012) argues that despite the failures at state and policy 
levels, social movements and indigenous groups continue to work at 
local levels to create spaces and processes where groups can link 
local alternative practices and ideas to jointly build new futures.  He 
believes that a new cycle of revolt will emerge in Latin America, 
																																								 																				
22 In another working paper I argue for “Commoning the political,” or the sharing of the political 
process between all actors who aspire for non-capitalist futures.  Such a process requires continuous 
evolution and reinvention until post-capitalist future(s) has(ve) been reached and involves ongoing, 
bottom-up collaboration and cooperation of diverse groups in open-ended, pluriversal, and 
prefigurative processes towards loosely defined, dynamic end goals (Hollender 2015b). 	
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building upon the lessons of the past, as evidenced by the continuous 
bubbling of outcry and discontent against the contradictions of 
current progressive governments.  However, Reyes fails to point to 
the exact locations and groups that he believes can rise from the still 
smoldering ashes.  Where he sees a continent rife with potential, 
others argue that the worst has yet to come, pointing to the drop in 
commodities prices and the systematic attacking and undermining 
of any remaining alternatives or opposition, especially those with 
foreign support (Villegas 2013 and 2014).  This raises doubt as to 
how and where alternatives can gain a viable foothold.  
Granted the precariousness of alternatives, there is a 
tendency by scholars to oversimplify or romanticize Bolivian social 
movements and the achievements MAS through claims that have not 
been backed by empirical evidence.  Many scholars eagerly grasp 
the colorful discourse and personae of Evo Morales, magnifying his 
image as a champion of indigenous social movements and the Rights 
of Nature, while neglecting the underlying contradictions and 
failures of MAS.  Such views frequently equate legislative victories 
with policy outcomes, despite warnings by scholars like Burstein 
and Linton (2002) that policies on paper are not always implemented 
or enacted into law.  Also, Latin American social movements are 
frequently portrayed as a unified force that is linked to a global 
“movement of movements,” despite the internal divisions and 
conflicts.  This misrepresentation is reinforced by studies who 
examine the influence of global “transnational advocacy networks” 
on states (Keck and Sikkink 1999), when in actuality the strategies, 
goals, and types of social movements look far beyond state-centric 
advocacy, as demonstrated by the growing presence of 
“autonomists, direct-actionists, post-anarchists, and post-marxists, 
as well as some indigenous, anarcha-feminist, and anti-colonial 
tendencies” (Reitan 2012).  
In celebrating the progressive image of Evo Morales and the 
exotic otherness of Bolivian social movements without examining 
the conflict and contradictions below the surface, scholars 
perpetuate inaccurate perspectives and legitimize the gap between 
discourse and practice. 
By overlooking the negative and contradictory policies and 
practices of the MAS administration, scholars contribute to these 
tendencies continuing with impunity.  While celebrating and 
analyzing the implications and potential of the new constitution, 
“nationalization,” and high social spending is important, rigorous 
research and investigation is also needed to examine disconcerting 
tendencies in Bolivia’s social, political, and economic spheres.  For 
example, allegations link the growth of real estate, commercial, and 
finance sectors, even as oil prices plummet, to the rise in illegal coca 
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production, narco-trafficking, and corruption.  Such research would 
be useful for exposing the structural barriers to change, both in 
Bolivia and beyond.   
The Bolivian social movements that maintain committed to 
the construction of non-capitalist alternatives are confronting 
oppressive systems at multiple scales, beginning with their own 
government.  The ongoing protests against the abandonment by 
MAS of campaign promises signals that a new cycle of struggle may 
be on the rise, one that encompasses a growing variety of social 
movement and non-movement actors within and outside of Bolivia.  
The lessons from the last cycle of Bolivian and Latin American 
struggles will continue to inform the cumulative learning of this new 
cycle within Latin America.  These lessons are important globally, 
as local populations increasingly identify and speak out against 
problems of inequality, injustice, and environmental destruction due 
to wider political, social, and economic systems (Hollender 2015).  
It is my hope that the perspectives provided in this paper about 
socio-political dynamics surrounding Bolivia’s MAS will serve as 
strategic tools for citizen groups, networks, and movements around 
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